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INTRODUCTION
This appeal is filed by Thomas G. Martin, M.D. (“Dr. Martin” or “Appellant”), due
to the early termination of his employment and revocation of his medical privileges, while
employed at the University of Utah. In August of 2013, Dr. Martin entered into his first
contract with the Department of Pharmacotherapy to act as the full-time Medical Director
at the Utah Poison Control Center (the “UPCC”), which started on October 1, of 2013, and
where he performed those duties for eight (8) months. R. at 00043 – 00047. In February
of 2014, Dr. Martin entered into a second contract relating to a “split position with [his]
primary appointment in the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery, to
start July 1, 2014[,]” through June 30, of 2015. R. 00051 – 00053. Dr. Martin’s second
contract was rescinded unexpectedly in May of 2014. R. at 00312. At the same time, the
Chief of the Division of Emergency Medicine, Dr. Barton (who had spearheaded the idea
of having a split position for the Medical Director at the UPCC) announced that he would
be leaving. R. at 02318, 02425, and 02648. Dr. Barton was asked to make any reductions
in the budget of the Division of Emergency Medicine before he left in June of 2014. R. at
02433. There were concerns regarding funding to pay for Dr. Martin when he transitioned
and whether the clinical shifts would be available. R. at 02374, and 02390. The University
of Utah and its individual employees’ (the “University” or “Defendants/Appellees”)
actions caused harm and unfair surprise to Dr. Martin.
Thereafter, Dr. Martin proceeded with litigation against the University, where
ultimately at the state court level, the trial court denied Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on Liability and erroneously granted the University’s Cross-Motion for
1
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Summary Judgment, as reflected in the Honorable Andrew H. Stone’s Memorandum
Decision of September 26, 2017 (“Memorandum Decision”), and subsequent Order entered
on November 17, 2017 (“Final Order”). R. at 03135 – 03145. 1
The trial court’s ruling should be reversed because in granting the University’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court: 1. Failed to follow the standards
required under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c), when there were disputed issues over material
facts and those facts or reasonable inferences were not viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, Dr. Martin (R. at 03136 – 01343); 2. Despite the heavily disputed
and conflicting material facts in the record, the trial court made improper factual
determinations regarding the material terms of the contracts in favor of the University, and
did not address the lack of good faith or fair dealing claim as a result (R. 03137 – 03144);
and, 3. Finally, the trial court improperly weighed and only considered the University’s
claims (that were not raised until after the termination had occurred) that University staff
had made an “error” in issuing clinical privileges and active medical staff appointment to
Dr. Martin, (R. at 03136 – 03144), and which Dr. Martin wholeheartedly disputed as the
active medical appointment with inpatient privileges was a requirement of his first signed
contract letter from August 15, 2013 (R. at 00046), not to mention a fundamental

1

See the Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants’ CrossMotion for Summary Judgment, (the “Final Order”) entered on November 17, 2017, by the
trial court, and attached hereto in the Addendum. The Final Order was not entered by the
trial court until after this Court filed a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition. The
University’s counsel had not previously submitted a proposed order as requested by the
trial court that was consistent with its Memorandum Decision. After Dr. Martin submitted
a response with the Final Order attached, this Court permitted briefing to continue.
2
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requirement of the UPPC, to remain an accredited poison control center with the American
Association of Poison Control Centers (“AAPCC”). R. at 02960 – 02962. Although the
record reflects that the University’s actions caused unfair surprise and extreme harm to Dr.
Martin, the trial court supported the University’s unilateral rescission of the second
employment offer (deeming it was not even a contract) without any due process to Dr.
Martin. R. at 03138 – 03142. The trial court incorrectly made a determination that Dr.
Martin had no vested interest or property interest in the clinical privileges or medical staff
appointment given to him the year before (despite referring to the contested position of
both parties)(R. 03140), and ignored the material facts in the record, or the Policy and
Bylaw provisions referenced by Dr. Martin, and failed to grant all reasonable inferences in
favor of Dr. Martin as the non-moving party. R. at 03140 – 03141.
As a result, Dr. Martin respectfully asks that this Court reverse the trial court and
remand the case back with instructions permitting Dr. Martin to proceed forward to trial.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE: Whether the trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Final Order,
should be reversed and remanded, where the trial court failed to apply the correct standard
in granting the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment despite genuine disputes
over material facts and without considering all the facts or reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to Dr. Martin?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c) is correctness, and an appellate court: “[R]eviews a trial court's ‘legal conclusions
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment’ for correctness, id., and views ‘the
3
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facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.’” 2 A summary judgment movant must show both that there is no
material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). 3 “Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R.
CIV. P. 56(c)” 4
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Dr. Martin’s Joint Reply Memorandum
in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability against the University and
Opposition Memorandum to the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
02959 – 03034, at 02947 – 02948, 02957), the University’s Joint Memorandum in
Opposition to Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Dr. Martin’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 01760 – 01852, at 01817-01819) , and at oral argument (R. 03190
- 03250, at 03208, and 03231-03235).
SECOND ISSUE: Whether the trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Final
Order, should be reversed and remanded, where the trial court improperly weighed
conflicting facts in favor of the University, to determine that a contract did not culminate
from the December 2013 signed acceptance letter between the University and Dr. Martin,
and that Dr. Martin’s actions “failed to fulfill the fundamental conditions of the offer”

2

See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 10 (emphasis added); see a
lso See also Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993)(overruled on
other grounds by Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64).
3
See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 10 (emphasis added); see also Martin v. Lauder,
2010 UT App 216, ¶ 4 (internal citations omitted).
4
See Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39, ¶ 9 (emphasis added).
4
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sufficient to warrant the unilateral rescission of the second employment contract by the
University?
Standard of Review: The standard of review is correctness, and the appellate court
reviews: “[A] district court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary
judgment for correctness.” 5 In Arata v. Shefco, Ltd., 2014 UT App 148, this Court further
held as follows: “A condition is ‘an event, not certain to occur, which must occur ... before
performance under a contract becomes due.’ ” … . Because “no duties arise between the
contracting parties until the condition has been fulfilled,”[], failure of “ ‘a material
condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform,’” … Whether a condition
precedent was fulfilled generally presents a question of fact.” 6
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on Liability against the University (R. 00166 - 00323, at 00171 – 00175, 00186
- 00189), the University’s Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Martin’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 01760 – 01852,
at 01843-01847) , and at oral argument (R. 03190 - 03250, at 03209 - 03212).
THIRD ISSUE: Whether the trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Final Order,
should be reversed and remanded, where the trial court held that Utah Courts do not
recognize a physician’s constitutionally protected property interest right relative to
employment or medical staff privileges, but even if recognized, that Dr. Martin suffered no

5

See Arata v. Shefco, Ltd., 2014 UT App 148, ¶ 6 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis
added).
6
See Id. at ¶ 8(internal citations omitted)(emphasis added); See also McArthur v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 UT 22.
5
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procedural due process violation in this case because “the defense maintains that this letter
[granting Dr. Martin active medical staff privileges] was issued in error” and the
University’s unilateral mistake (and that was only raised after Dr. Martin had been actually
acting as the Medical Director for eight months at the UPCC) apparently justified rescission
of the contract, despite the unfair harm to Dr. Martin?
Standard of Review: The standard of review is both correctness and a clearly
erroneous standard. “Constitutional issues, including questions regarding due process, are
questions of law that we review for correctness... However, because [these questions
require] the application of facts in the record to the due process standard, we incorporate
a clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations.”. …
Procedural due process claims are evaluated under a two-part test. The first question is
“whether the [complaining party] has been deprived of a protected interest” in property or
liberty. … If the court finds deprivation of a protected interest, we consider whether the
procedures at issue comply with due process. Id.” 7
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the Memorandum Decision (R. 03135 –
03145, at 03136, 03140 - 03141), Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability
against the University (R. 00166 - 00323, at 00183 – 00186), the University’s Joint
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Dr.
Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 01760 – 01852, at 01820-01840), Dr. Martin’s
Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability

7

See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, at ¶¶ 47-48
(internal citations omitted)(emphasis added).
6
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against the University and Opposition Memorandum to the University’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 02918 – 02958, at 02934 – 02935, 02948 – 02954), and at oral
argument (R. 03190 - 03250, at 03193 - 03208).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Relevant Facts
1.

Dr. Martin is a physician Board Certified in Emergency Medicine and

Preventative Medicine (Occupational) and Medical Toxicology. In addition, Dr. Martin
has been recognized by the American College of Emergency Physicians for thirty (30)
years of continuous Board Certification. R. at 00006.
2.

On August 2, 2013, Dr. Martin was offered the position of the Medical

Director for the UPCC, with a faculty appointment in the College of Pharmacy at the rank
of Associate Professor (Clinical), at the University of Utah. R. at 00043. The position was
anticipated to “transition to a split position with your primary academic appointment in
the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery, to start July 1, 2014.” See
Id. (emphasis added). The proposed start date was October 1, 2013. R. at 00043 – 44; See
also Memorandum Decision, R. 03135 – 03145, at 03135 – 03136. 8

8

Dr. Martin recognizes that pursuant to State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, he is not required
to marshal every scrap of evidence to support the trial court’s specific factual
determinations that he is challenging herein, but rather, for persuasive purpose, Dr. Martin
is providing facts as well as inferences, that were favorable to him but that the trial court
did not include or misstated. Dr. Martin is aware that the Supreme Court of Utah has:
“repudiate[d] the default notion of marshaling sometimes put forward in our cases and
reaffirm[ed] the traditional principle of marshaling as a natural extension of an appellant’s
burden of persuasion.” See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 41. In addition, Dr. Martin is
also aware that under the Advisory Committee Notes on the 2017 Amendments to Rule 24,
it states as follows: “Paragraph (a)(8). The 2017 amendments remove the reference to
7
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3.

The “split position” was unusual, (R. at 02419), and had never been done

before at the University to Ms. Thompson’s knowledge (R. at 03047); however, it was an
idea spearheaded by the then Chief of the Emergency Medicine Division, Dr. Erik Barton,
as he, along with Dr. Barbara Crouch, wanted the Department of Pharmacotherapy and the
UPCC to have a toxicology fellowship program jointly with the Department of Surgery.
R. 02413 - 02414.
4.

On August 15, 2013, Dr. Martin received an updated letter for the same

position. R. 00046 – 00047, and 03136. It had additional language, including that Dr.
Martin had to obtain a license to practice medicine in the State of Utah “and a medical
staff appointment at University Hospitals & Clinics.” R. at 00046 (emphasis added).
5.

It was necessary that Dr. Martin obtain his clinical privileges and a medical

staff appointment at the University Hospital & Clinics because, (and as Dr. Martin asserted
in his Declaration), the UPCC is an accredited poison center with the AAPCC, and to
maintain accreditation it is required that: “The Medical Director and all other individuals
designated as providers of medical direction must have medical staff appointments at an
inpatient treatment facility”.[] R. at 02961. Furthermore, it is an AAPCC requirement that
any Medical Director must be a practicing physician. R. at 01960.
6.

Dr. Martin accepted the offer in August of 2013. R at 03136.

7.

Thereafter, upon reliance of the signed offer and without knowledge of prior

marshaling. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645, holds that the failure to marshal
is not a technical deficiency resulting in default, but is a manner in which an appellant may
carry its burden of persuasion when challenging a finding or verdict.” See Rules App. Proc.,
Rule 24, Editors’ Notes.
8
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discussions between Dr. Brixner and Dr. Crouch of the “temporary” nature of the position,
Dr. Martin relocated from Seattle where he bought a condominium in Salt Lake City, and
obtained his medical licenses in the State of Utah on September 6, 2013. R. at 00008.
8.

In September of 2014, Dr. Barton, informed Dr. Martin that the credentialing

process for the Department of Surgery, Division of Emergency Medicine, would take “four
to six months” to complete and that “[Rebecca] Bryce in the Division of Emergency
Medicine would contact him about the application for an appointment in the Department
of Surgery and for clinical privileges.[] R. at 01802.
9.

The record reflects that during the various application processes (of which

there were at least four (4) different full applications) that would proceed over the following
months , that Dr. Martin responded to over one hundred (100) e-mail exchanges in an effort
to be responsive. R. at 02510.
10.

On October 1, 2013, Dr. Martin started as the full-time Medical Director at

the UPCC. R. at 00008.
11.

On October 9, 2013, Dr. Martin’s credentialing application for his role as the

Medical Director was approved by the University’s Credentialing Committee. R. at 00008.
12.

On October 16, 2013, a full copy of Dr. Martin’s application for credentialing

with the Department of Pharmacotherapy was sent to Rebecca Bryce, an Administrative
Assistant in the Division of Emergency Medicine, by Jeffrey Carter (with the exact same
three letters of reference that would be sought by Ms. Bryce a few months later). R. at
00008 – 00009.
13.

On November 12, 2013, the President of the University of Utah, issued a
9
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letter to Dr. Martin, advising him that, “the University’s Board of Trustees has approved
your appointment in the full-time clinical track as Associate Professor (Clinical) of
Pharmacotherapy, effective October 1, 2013 and ending June 30, 2014.” R. at 00009.
14.

On November 19, 2013, Dr. Martin received a letter from Ms. Heidi

Thompson, the Manager of Medical Staff services, confirming that his application for
privileges at the University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics had been approved. It was
documented that: “Your reappointment/appoint is for the period:
10/01/2015” and the “Category: Active Status:

10/02/2013 to

Provisional Division:

Emergency

Medicine Department: SURGERY”. R. at 00049.
15.

During her deposition, the Rule 30(b)(6) University representative, Ms. Lisa

Hooper, who is the present Manager of the Medical Staff Offices and Business Operations
Manager, testified that after November 19, 2013, when Dr. Martin received that letter of
appointment to the UUHC, that the medical Bylaws applied to him. R. at 02835 – 02836.
Ms. Hooper also agreed that under the provision in subsection 5.D.5, of the Bylaws, at page
52, it does not contemplate a circumstance where for some reason the applicant would be
given clinical privileges before the faculty appointment. R. at 02886.
16.

In December of 2013, Dr. Martin was offered the second, or “split” position

on the faculty in the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery at the
University of Utah, within the School of Medicine. Dr. Martin’s appointment offer was as
an Associate Professor and Medical Director of the Utah Poison Control Center, in the
Clinical Track beginning July 1, 2014. The second offer letter stated in pertinent part,
certain instructions and guidelines:
10
SLC_3653173.1

You need a confirmed academic appointment through the School of
Medicine and medical credentialing approval through University Hospital.
We will send you instructions regarding your responsibility in obtaining
the necessary documents for your academic appointment; Utah medical
license; DEA license, and medical credentialing that must be completed
according to the timeline set by the department. … Your initial salary will be
$252,000 plus benefits … This salary is guaranteed for the first twelve
months after which you will be included in the Division of Emergency
Medicine Faculty Performance Incentive Plan beginning July 2015. … As
a clinical faculty member in the Clinical Track you will be asked to fulfill a
minimum of 48 clinical shifts per year (average 4 shifts per month) in the
emergency department with the remainder of your responsibilities as
Medical Director of the Utah Poison Control Center.
R. at 00051 – 00053.
17.

Dr. Martin accepted the second offer on February 26, 2014. See Id.

18.

Based on the prior representations by Dr. Barton, the anticipated completion

date for the hiring process on the second position was between April and June of 2014. R.
at 01802.
19.

Also, the deposition testimony of Ms. Hooper reflected that there should have

been a separate set of instructions issued from either the Department of Surgery or the
Division of Emergency Medicine to Dr. Martin regarding his second faculty appointment
application, with a letter that explained the timelines, and the separate nature of the
departments and that they could not share information. R. at 02839 – 02840.
20.

On January 21, 2014, Dr. Martin received an e-mail from Ms. Bryce (who

already had his full faculty appointment from October with the same three letters of
reference), asking about 2 references, which he responded to, and then he received another
e-mail near the end of February from Ms. Peacock, with follow-up on March 28, and April
4, 2014, and their e-mails addressed different things regarding his letters of reference. R.
11
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at 00011 - 00012. None of those e-mails sent provided a timeline for when Dr. Martin’s
second faculty application was due. See Id.
21.

During the early months of 2014, Dr. Martin had at least twenty-six (26)

mutual e-mail exchanges, with four (4) or five (5) additional text messages also sent to Dr.
Townes by Dr. Martin regarding the reference letter needing to be on letterhead. R. at
00012.
22.

What Dr. Martin did not know was that, in the beginning of April of 2014,

two things happened internally within the University. First, Dr. Barton announced he was
leaving to move to California and the Department of Surgery were reviewing the Division
of Emergency Medicine’s budget because there had been cuts to funding, and there was
scrutiny of all new hires. Before Dr. Barton left, he was asked to make a proposed budget
for the upcoming year, incorporating any reductions he could. On the matrix for the Budget
for the Division of Emergency Medicine, Dr. Martin was not included on the 2014/2015
Schedule (unlike Dr. Barton or Dr. Madsen, who were included but whose names were
stricken out). Also, for the first time, the Division of Emergency Medicine was going to
be contributing 25% towards the salary of the Medical Director of the Utah Poison Control
Center starting on July 1, 2014, a commitment made by Dr. Barton, who was no longer
staying. R. at 00012 – 00013.
23.

Dr. Brixner, the Chair of the Department of Pharmacotherapy, testified in her

deposition, that she: “knew that [the Division of Emergency Medicine] had some budget
constraint concerns, which was another – going to be another concern was whether they
were even going to be able to pay for him or not in July.” R. at 02698.
12
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24.

Also, during his deposition, Dr. Hartsell admitted that he inherited budget

cuts when he came on as the Chief of the Division of Emergency Medicine in late spring
of 2014, and further, when asked about an e-mail that Dr. Crouch sent in September of
2014 to Dr. Brixner and others (two months after Dr. Martin had left) regarding the
Emergency Department not being willing to pay any portion of the salary of the medical
director or providing any clinical shifts in September of 2014, and whether anything had
changed from July 1, 2014 and September, Dr. Hartsell stated: “A. I think by that time
we realized how tight we were, and so there was nothing available clinically at the
University Hospital to provide the ability to do clinical work in our Emergency
Department.” R. at 02366.
25.

Only on April 21, 2014, for the first time, and shortly after the e-mails

scrutinizing the budget, was Dr. Martin put on written notice by Dr. Barton that if he did
not complete two final things (within only 4 days) or by April 25, 2014, on his credentialing
application packet, that his “packet will not be approved and you will not have your clinical
appointment in the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery, or be able to
work in our ED starting in July.” R. at 00262.
26.

On April 23, 2014, Dr. Martin responded to Dr. Barton to inform him that

his CV had been submitted in the proper format, one letter of reference on letterhead was
submitted, and the other two were promised and that would fulfill all outstanding
requirements. R. at 00263. The administrative assistant whom Dr. Martin had been
working with confirmed in a subsequent email to Dr. Martin that she had timely submitted
the properly formatted CV on April 25, 2014. R. at 00271.
13
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27.

On April 30, 2014, Dr. Martin received a positive e-mail notifying him and

other staff members of his approved provider status. That e-mail indicated that as of April
28, 2014, Dr. Martin, as a provider in the “Surgery/Emergency Medicine” Department, was
granted “added inpatient admission privileges and toxicology consultation privileges.”
R. at 00268.
28.

On May 6, 2014, Paula Peacock, Administrative Assistant to Dr. Barton, sent

an e-mail to both Dr. Hartsell and Dr. Barton. Ms. Peacock stated that: “I heard from
Academic Affairs this morning. Yesterday, they spoke with Phyllis Vetter, in General
Counsel. If Dr. Martin has failed to provide the necessary documents in order to submit
his file in to meet the deadline, then you would be able to cancel his offer for an
appointment.” Then Ms. Peacock went on and concluded her e-mail with the statement:
“If the decision is to go forward with his appointment, he still needs one external letter on
stationary. His start date would be August 1st.” R. at 00272.
29.

On May 13, 2013, Dr. Martin received a notification from the Manager of

Medical Staff Services that upon the recommendation of the Credentials Committee and
approval of the Medical Board and Hospital Board, his additional privileges had been
approved for inpatient consultation privileges. R. at 00297. Dr. Martin was also scheduled
to work shifts starting in June of 2014. R. at 00270.
30.

Later that same day, on May 13, 2014, Dr. Martin received a separate email

from Dr. Barton addressing that there remained a problem with Dr. Martin’s file. Dr.
Martin took immediate steps that same day to try to correct the situation. R. at 00109. Dr.
Martin testified in his deposition that between April 23 and May 13, 2014, no one contacted
14
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him and he thought everything had been completed in a timely manner. In fact, Dr. Martin
was not aware that an extension had been granted to May 3rd until the litigation occurred.
31.

It came to light that one letter of reference apparently was not produced on

letterhead by Dr. Townes through no fault of Dr. Martin, but everything else had been
completed. R. at 00462. Ms. Peacock provided a self-serving declaration addressing a
requirement regarding letterhead, yet attached to her declaration was a checklist, and
nowhere on that checklist was such a requirement stated. R. 02759 – 2764. Apparently,
Dr. Martin’s reference, Dr. Townes, thought he had already provided the updated letter to
the Department of Surgery and was confused due to the multiple letters of reference that
he had already sent on Dr. Martin’s behalf for his position. Accordingly, on May 13, 2014,
Dr. Townes apologized to Dr. Martin and re-sent the letter on the letterhead in an e-mail of
May 15, 2014. R. at 00462. As a result, any issue with Dr. Martin’s application had been
corrected, at the latest, by May 15, 2014. R. at 00273.
32.

Although Dr. Martin tried to find out how he could fix the issue, or at least

explain what had happened, no one was willing to meet with him.
33.

During his deposition, Dr. Barton testified that the reason that Dr. Martin was

not accepted was actually because he didn’t think Dr. Martin would be a good fit, based on
the e-mail interactions that his two assistants had had with Dr. Martin, and specifically with
Ms. Paula Peacock. However, Dr. Barton admitted that Dr. Martin was never told that the
denial was related to any purported interactions between himself and the assistants. R.
02519 – 02520. Although Dr. Barton said that it was a group decision not to move forward
with Dr. Martin’s appointment with the Division of Emergency Medicine, based on his
15
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input, as well as Dr. Finlayson, the Chair of the Department of Surgery that occurred at a
meeting with others, during his subsequent deposition, Dr. Finlayson did not recall the
details of that meeting. R. at 02725.
34.

On May 27, 2014, Dr. Martin received a letter from Dr. Hartsell indicating

that his faculty appointment in the Division of Emergency Medicine, had not proceeded
successfully in a timely manner and his file was rejected, and that his School of Medicine
(“SOM”) faculty appointment process had been terminated as of that date. R. at 00114.
35.

On May 28, 2014, Dr. Martin also received an e-mail from Ms. Thompson

indicating that his privileges and medical staff appointment apparently were terminated as
of the May 27, 2014 letter because it was a purported “error” on the Medical Staff Offices
part to have issued those privileges to Dr. Martin under the Medical Bylaws. R. at 01339.
36.

On May 30, 2014, Dr. Martin wrote to the Dean of the College of Pharmacy

to try and see if there was anything else he could do to stay on with his employment. The
Dean forwarded the e-mail on to Dr. Brixner, whose response was unforgiving and she
stated that it was already predetermined that: “[Dr. Crouch] plans to end his contract June
30th and go back to OR taking their on calls until she finds a new MD Director.” R. at
00018 – 00019.
37.

On June 2, 2014, Dr. Martin was able to meet with Dr. Hartsell, and Dr.

Hartsell indicated he would have no problem with Dr. Martin continuing on as the Medical
Director while having his primary privileges through Occupational Medicine/Family
Medicine, yet when Dr. Martin followed up with Occupational Medicine, the offer to meet
was suddenly withdrawn. R. at 00019.
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38.

On June 2, 2014, Dr. Crouch also had a phone call with Dr. Hartsell and then

sent an e-mail to Dean Ireland and Dr. Brixner, further discouraging either of them from
permitting Dr. Martin to continue on at the University. R. at 00019.
39.

Dr. Brixner, the Chair of the Department of Pharmacotherapy, testified that

even if Dr. Martin would have gotten a faculty appointment with the Department of
Occupational and Family Medicine, who initially was very interested in working with Dr.
Martin, it would not have supported her “strategy”. Dr. Brixner did not support that
appointment: “Because it’s not our strategy. It wasn’t what we wanted. We wanted to
work with the School of Medicine and the Department of Emergency Medicine.” R. at
02672.
40.

On June 25, 2014, Dr. Martin received a letter from the College of Pharmacy

indicating that they were aware that Dr. Martin had not obtained an academic appointment
and they did not have an acceptable alternative because of the other requirements for
accreditation from the AAPCC. R. at 00121.
41.

On July 9, 2014, Dr. Martin received a letter from the Medical Staff Services

indicating that the Board had acknowledged Dr. Martin’s “resignation” from the Active
staff effective “5/27/2014 and that the following reason was given for your resignation:
Termination by Department.” The letter from the University contained improper
mischaracterizations of Dr. Martin’s employment. R. 00123.
42.

Based on the University’s actions, Dr. Martin asserted that the University

violated its own Policies and Procedures. Dr. Martin relied upon Section 6-300, University
Faculty, of the Policies, where early termination is addressed because the policy states that
17
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faculty members have legal rights and privileges and faculty members are entitled to “due
process” when substantial sanctions are considered. R. at 00022 – 00023.
43.

Finally, Dr. Martin asserted that the University also violated their Medical

Bylaws in two parts; first regarding its Credentialing Policies, where the University failed
to give Dr. Martin the adequate time to correct any purported issue with the faculty
appointment application that was submitted to the Division of Emergency Medicine, within
the School of Medicine (which the Bylaws apply to); and second, the University violated
its Bylaws when it indicated that it was terminating Dr. Martin’s privileges and medical
staff appointment, which requires, at a minimum, some basic due process, given that the
termination occurred purportedly based on a negligent and unilateral error committed by
the University in prematurely issuing Dr. Martin his clinical privileges and medical staff
appointment. R. at 00021 – 00027.
Procedural History
44.

This case began in November of 2014 with a formal Notice of Claim. R. at

00170 – 00171.
45.

On April 10, 2015, Dr. Martin timely filed his Verified Complaint and Jury

Demand in federal court under Case No.: 2:15-cv-00248. An Answer was filed on June
11, 2015, and the parties moved forward with full written discovery and ten (10)
depositions were also taken. On July 12, 2016, Dr. Martin filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment seeking a liability determination on all of his claims. 9 On July 22, 2016, rather

9

See D.E. 32.
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than file an opposition memorandum, the University filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and asserted immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. 10
46.

On August 29, 2016, after hearing oral argument on the University’s Motion,

Judge Jenkins entered the Order 11 with his ruling that all claims were dismissed, without
prejudice. 12 While Dr. Martin sought equitable relief, including his attorneys’ fees and
costs, for having to respond to the University’s late motion, Judge Jenkins felt he no longer
had jurisdiction to address that request, although he recognized the delayed nature of the
University’s filing and Dr. Martin’s concerns.
47.

On September 28, 2016, Dr. Martin timely filed his Complaint in state court.

Dr. Martin asserted six causes of action in his Complaint for: 1. Lack of Procedural Due
Process under the Utah Constitution; 2. Lack of Procedural Due Process under the United
States Constitution; 3. Breach of Contract; 4. Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 5.
Negligence; and 6. Injunctive Relief. R. 00001 – 00038.
48.

On October 20, 2016, Dr. Martin filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on

Liability against the University, and attached over one hundred and sixty pages (160) pages
in supporting documents. R. 00166 – 00323.
49.

On November 21, 2016, the University filed a Motion to Dismiss. R. 00327

– 00349. On May 1, 2017, oral argument was heard on the University’s Motion to Dismiss,

10
11
12

See D.E. 33.
See D.E. 44.
See Id.
19

SLC_3653173.1

where the trial court denied the University’s Motion on five of the six causes of action, but
granted the University’s Motion as to the Fifth Cause of Action for Negligence, and
dismissed it (while reserving whether it was with prejudice or not). R. 00881 – 00886.
50.

On June 23, 2017, the University filed its Joint Opposition to Dr. Martin’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and the University’s Motion for Summary Judgment. R.
01760 – 01852. After full briefing on both Motions for Summary Judgment, the trial court
heard oral argument on September 6, 2017.
51.

On September 26, 2017, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision. R.

03135 – 03145. On October 24, 2017, Plaintiff timely filed his Notice of Appeal, which
was received by the Utah Appellate Courts on October 25, 2017. R. 03146 – 03148.
52.

On November 15, 2017, this Court issued a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary

Disposition after it noted that a Final Order had not been submitted in this case. On
November 17, 2017, the Final Order was entered, (R. 03163 – 03165) and on November
28, 2017, undersigned submitted a Response, after which this Court permitted briefing to
proceed.
Disposition of the Case in the Trial Court
53.

Dr. Martin and the University both moved for summary judgment before the

trial court. R. 00166 – 00323 and 01760 - 01852.
54.

Dr. Martin filed a Joint Opposition Memorandum to the University’s Motion

for Summary Judgment, as well as a Reply in support of his Motion for Summary
Judgment. R. 02918 – 02958.
55.

In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court rejected Dr. Martin’s assertion
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that the University should be found liable on his due process, contractual, or injunctive
relief, claims and denied Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability against
the University. R. 03135 - 03145. In that same Memorandum Decision, the trial court then
unfairly weighed and adopted the disputed facts and inferences in favor of University and
granted the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, which resulted in the
dismissal of Dr. Martin’s claims with prejudice.
56.

Presently, Dr. Martin has moved the trial court to stay the proceedings,

pending the outcome of this appeal. R. 03173 – 3187.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Dr. Martin asserts that the trial court failed to apply the correct standard of review
when addressing competing motions for summary judgment. See Martin v. Lauder, 2010
UT App 216, ¶¶ 7-8. In addition, the trial court weighed the conflicting evidence,
credibility of the witnesses, and interpreted the record in a manner that was unfairly skewed
in favor of the University on its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, which should not
have been granted and constitutes grounds for reversal. See Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT
App 216, ¶ 14. Not only did the trial court improperly assign weight to the conflicting
evidence, but the trial court reached legal conclusions regarding whether a condition
precedent had been fulfilled, which generally presents a questions of fact. See Arata v.
Shefco, 2014 UT App 148, ¶ 8. In addition, the trial court incorrectly applied the law when
it made a determination regarding where there was an offer versus a contract and in relation
to Dr. Martin’s Fourth Cause of Action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing “that every contract is subject to[.]” See Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812
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P.2d 49, 55 (1991).
Finally, in failing to grant all inferences in favor of Dr. Martin, the trial court
minimized the Declaration of Dr. Martin where Dr. Martin identified why the University
correctly issued both a medical staff appointment and clinical privileges to him, in favor of
Ms. Thompson’s testimony. As a result, the trial court improperly determined that Dr.
Martin did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his medical staff
appointment or clinical privileges.

Moreover, the trial court also applied the law

incorrectly regarding Spackman ex. rel. Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder Cty. Sch.
Dist., 16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000), as it related to Dr. Martin’s state constitutional rights. Also,
while Utah appellate courts have not specifically addressed the issue, in a federal context
and under Osuagwu v. Gila Regional Medical Center, 938 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1158 (D. N.M.
2012), it has been repeatedly held that a physician’s “[m]edical staff privileges embody
such a valuable property interest that notice and hearing should be held prior to [their]
termination or withdrawal[.]” See Id.
Given the multiple errors committed by the trial court, this Court should reverse the
trial court’s holding in granting the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as
reflected in its Memorandum Decision and Final Order, and remand with further
instructions that permit Dr. Martin to move forward to trial.
ARGUMENT
In this case, summary judgment was only appropriate if no genuine issue of material
fact existed and the Defendants/Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (1983)(overruled on other grounds by
22
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Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64). Dr. Martin asserts that there were numerous
genuinely disputed material facts regarding key issues reflected in the record, where even
if his Motion for Summary Judgment was correctly denied by the trial court, the existence
of that conflicting evidence should have also mandated denial of the University’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment in this case.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO APPLY THE CORRECT STANDARD
IN GRANTING THE UNIVERSITY’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MANDATES REVERSAL.
Before reciting the facts in its Memorandum Decision, it was expected that the trial

court would have included reference to the applicable standard of review in granting
summary judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c), where a court must: “view the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (1983)(overruled on other
grounds by Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64). The trial court failed to cite to
either the Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56 standard, or point out the slightly more complex review
that needs to occur when there are competing dispositive motions.
This Court has previously recognized, when faced with cross-motions for summary
judgment, that:
To be entitled to summary judgment, a party filing a cross-motion for
summary judgment must establish its own entitlement to summary judgment
rather than simply rely on the other party’s failure on its own motion … “it
is not true that once both parties move for summary judgment the court is
bound to grant it to one side or another” … typically “the denial of
[plaintiffs’] motion for summary judgment only mean[s] the [plaintiffs]
would have to prove their claim at trial”[].
See Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT App 216, ¶ 7.
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Dr. Martin concedes that the University stated the correct standard for review of
cross-motions for summary judgment in its joint memorandum:
“Cross-motions for summary judgment do not ipso facto dissipate factual
issues, even though both parties contend ... that they are entitled to prevail
because there are no material issues of fact.” … Rather, cross-motions may
be viewed as involving a contention by each movant that no genuine issue of
fact exists under the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no
dispute remains under the theory advanced by its adversary.
R. at 01818 – 01819 (internal citations omitted).
The University also points out that: “In effect, each cross-movant implicitly
contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but that if the court determines
otherwise, factual disputes exists which preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of
the other side.” R. at 01819, See also Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT 216, ¶ 8. Here, both
parties asserted there were disputed facts, which should have precluded granting judgment
in favor of the University.
Review of the entire Memorandum Decision reveals that it is devoid of any
reference to the correct standard of review, or recognition of how to resolve cross-motions
for summary judgment. R. at 03135 – 03145. Accordingly, the trial court’s determinations
understandably failed to consider the University’s Cross-Motion in the appropriate context,
or review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, (i.e. Dr. Martin),
and that ultimately led to the incorrect granting of the University’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment.
At a minimum, the factual determinations provided by “the defense” that Dr. Martin
contested, and the trial court relied upon to Dr. Martin’s detriment included:
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“The defense maintains that this letter [approving Dr. Martin’s application
for privileges] was issued in error because the plaintiff did not have a faculty
appointment in the School of Medicine or the Department of Surgery.
(Deposition Exhibit 70).” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03136 (emphasis added).
“The defense denies that the plaintiff’s CV was in the proper format.” R.
03135 – 03145, at 03137 (emphasis added).
“However, the defense maintains that this was past the April 25th or May 3rd
deadlines that the plaintiff had been given and only after Dr. Barton had
already informed the plaintiff of his failed application.” R. 03135 – 03145,
at 03138 (emphasis added).
“According to the defense, the plaintiff was not a faculty member of the
School of Medicine and therefore should never have received privileges in
the first place.” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03138 (emphasis added).
Each of the determinations referenced above were premised on a disputed fact
identified by Dr. Martin, where the University presented an opposing view of, creating
genuine issues, and where the trial court should not have granted the University’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT’S DETERMINATIONS THAT DR. MARTIN’S
ACTIONS “FAILED TO FULFILL THE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS
OF THE OFFER” SUCH THAT “THE CONTINGENCY DID NOT OCCUR,
[AND] THE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE OFFER NEVER ROSE TO THE
LEVEL OF A CONTRACT” WERE IMPROPER.
Dr. Martin had two employment contracts, and the trial court’s statements that the

December 2013 offer letter never rose to the level of a contract in this case, is an improper
determination regarding the merits of the case that are better left to a jury.
Generally, formation of a contract requires an offer, an acceptance, and
consideration. … … The obligations of the parties must be “set forth with
sufficient definiteness that [the contract] can be performed.” … “The terms
of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining
the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.” … “An
acceptance is a manifestation of assent to an offer, such that an objective,
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reasonable person is justified in understanding that a fully enforceable
contract has been made.” … It “must unconditionally assent to all material
terms presented in the offer, including price and method of performance
…”. 13
Here, the trial court took it upon itself to evaluate Dr. Martin’s contractual claims
on the merits, which was not proper. Moreover, not only did the trial court determine that
the language in the second offer constituted condition precedents versus covenants or a
breach, but then the trial court determined that any issues regarding the second contract
(which Dr. Martin had corrected by May 15, 2014), constituted a failure to fulfill a material
condition precedent, which was not proper. Whether a material condition precedent exists,
and then whether it has been fulfilled or not, is a question of fact better left for a jury to
determine:
“A condition is ‘an event, not certain to occur, which must occur ... before
performance under a contract becomes due.’”… . Because “no duties arise
between the contracting parties until the condition has been fulfilled,” id.,
failure of “‘a material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to
perform,’” … Whether a condition precedent was fulfilled generally
presents a question of fact.
See Arata v. Shefco, Ltd., 2014 UT App 148, ¶ 8 (internal citations omitted).
At most, the terms of the second contract would have to be deemed ambiguous, or
at a minimum, incomplete, when Dr. Martin was not provided any instructions or a deadline
prior to the e-mail of Dr. Barton on April 21, 2014.
Again, however, rather than view the facts in favor of Dr. Martin, the trial court
made numerous factual determinations, to Dr. Martin’s detriment, that included:

13

See Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101, ¶¶ 24-25 (internal citations omitted).
26

SLC_3653173.1

“By its very nature, the offer which was contingent upon the review and
acceptance of a properly submitted application lacked mutuality and
necessarily implied a right to decline the application … In this case, the
plaintiff failed to fulfill the fundamental conditions of the offer submitting
an application in the proper format and with the requisite corollary
documents. Given the notifications to the plaintiff of the deficiencies in the
application process and his failure to fulfill the requirements by the stated
deadline, the offer was effectively terminated or revoked. Thus, since the
contingency did not occur the School of Medicine offer never rose to the
level of a contract.” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03143.
“Further, the plaintiff’s assertion that he was not provided with written
instructions relative to the application process or an actual deadline is clearly
contradicted by the record showing that he was repeatedly contacted
regarding his obligations in completing the application, the stated deadline(s)
and the consequences of a failure to follow through. The March and April,
2014, correspondence between the plaintiff and the various individual
defendants confirms that he was fully aware of the requirements and the
deadlines, but nevertheless failed to comply, leading to a rejection of this
application because it was incomplete.” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03140.
“As a corollary, where the plaintiff cannot assert a breach of contract claim,
he is also barred from asserting his Fourth Cause of Action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing []… Likewise, the plaintiff
has not explained how his own failure to fulfill the School of Medicine
conditional offer would implicate the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03144.
The trial court should have construed the facts and all reasonable inferences taken
therefrom in favor of Dr. Martin, including the inference that no matter what Dr. Martin
did to correct the issues with the application, the University no longer wanted to have him
as the Medical Director of the UPCC, now that Dr. Barton was leaving, and because the
Division of Emergency Medicine did not want to pay any portion of his salary and no
longer had shifts to provide for him within the Emergency Department. Moreover, whether
the small oversight by a third party regarding putting a letter on letterhead should be
deemed a material failure, is an issue better left to a jury.
27
SLC_3653173.1

Once Dr. Martin completed the requirements needed to fulfill all of the terms of the
second offer, or by May 15, 2014, that created a contract, where the University then had
an obligation to perform. Instead, the evidence reflects that the University rescinded the
contract, and came up with the claim that Dr. Martin’s privileges and medical staff
appointment were issued in error based on a revisionist theory, and which the trial court
adopted, again, to the detriment of Dr. Martin.
While rescission or unilateral revocation is permitted in some circumstances, a party
is “not entitled to rescission if [the] mistake occurred as a result of that party’s own
negligence[].”

See Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1191

(1993)(internal citations omitted). In this case, the trial court claimed that Dr. Martin had
failed to demonstrate how his own “failure to fulfill the School of Medicine conditional
offer would implicate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing[.]” Yet, the trial court
ignored the fact that Dr. Martin did complete the application, and could have started in his
second position in the Division of Emergency Medicine starting on August 1, 2014, but for
the fact that the University did not want to fulfill the terms of the contract, and so
unilaterally rescinded the contract to the unfair surprise and harm of Dr. Martin. The
University’s unconscionable actions should not be permitted.
Finally, under St. Benedicts Development Company v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 811
P. 2d 194, 199 (1991), it is well recognized that: “In this state, a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, contractual relationships.” Here, a contractual
relationship was created between the parties with the execution of the first contract in
August of 2013, and continued with the execution of the second contract in February of
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2014. The conduct and dealings of the parties should be considered, where given that Dr.
Martin had been there for numerous months, that the University should have acted in good
faith prior to terminating his employment and rescinding the second employment offer
under the pretext of a failure to obtain an academic appointment, particularly when the
record reflects that he did fulfill all components of it, apart from a de minimus oversight by
a third party, that he quickly had corrected as soon as he became aware of the issue.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS IN DETERMINING
THAT DR. MARTIN DID NOT HAVE A PROTECTED PROPERTY, OR
LIBERTY, INTEREST IN EITHER OF HIS FACULTY POSITIONS OR
MEDICAL PRIVILEGES SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS.
The Supreme Court of Utah has identified a two-part test to evaluate procedural due

process claims:
Procedural due process claims are evaluated under a two-part test. The first
question is “whether the [complaining party] has been deprived of a protected
interest” in property or liberty. … If the court finds deprivation of a protected
interest, we consider whether the procedures at issue comply with due
process.[]
See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 48 (internal
citations omitted).
Under the first prong of the due process analysis, the trial court should have applied
the facts in the record to the due process standard to make a determination on whether the
University failed to meet the due process standard. The trial court should have done so, in
the light most favorable regarding whether the termination of Dr. Martin’s employment as
a faculty member and revocation of his medical staff appointment and clinical privileges
deprived him of a protected property, or liberty, interest.

29
SLC_3653173.1

The trial court absolutely did not apply the facts and all reasonable inferences in
favor of Dr. Martin, where the trial court made factual determinations against Dr. Martin
supporting the University’s decision not to accept his faculty appointment application, even
once complete, and rescission of the second contract with the Department of Surgery, in
addition to reiterating the defense’s assertion that Dr. Martin was granted his medical staff
appointment and privileges prematurely, such that the University could terminate both
terms of employment early without due process.
The trial court held that: “Ultimately, the plaintiff did not have the required
academic appointment and was therefore not entitled to continued enjoyment of the
medical staff privileges which were prematurely granted.” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03142.
“Ultimately, the plaintiff did not have a right to a School of Medicine faculty appointment
and did not have a right to continued employment beyond the term of the first agreement.
He has therefore suffered no deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest.”
R. 03135 – 03145, at 03140.
The trial court’s application of facts in favor of the University, was clearly
erroneous, and Dr. Martin contested the facts underlying the trial court’s determinations in
his Joint Memorandum in Opposition to the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on
Liability. R. at 02918 – 02958.
Although, Dr. Martin acknowledges that Utah Courts have not held specifically that
a physician holds a protected property interest in his or her medical staff appointment and
clinical privileges, the lack of case law at the state level does not minimize the federal case
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law, which can be viewed as persuasive as to the presumption that physicians practicing in
the State of Utah should also have a recognized and protected property interest in their
privileges:
The Eleventh, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits have explicitly held that a physician
has a constitutionally-protected property interest in medical-staff privileges
where the hospital's bylaws detail an extensive procedure to be followed
when corrective action or suspension or reduction of these privileges is going
to be taken. See Shahawy v. Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir.1989)
(holding that a physician has a “constitutionally-protected property interest
in medical staff privileges”); Yashon v. Hunt, 825 F.2d 1016, 1022–27 (6th
Cir.1987); Northeast Ga. Radiological Assoc. v. Tidwell, 670 F.2d 507, 511
(5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (“Medical staff privileges embody such a valuable
property interest that notice and hearing should be held prior to [their]
termination or withdrawal, absent some extraordinary situation where a valid
government or medical interest is at stake.”). The Tenth Circuit has noted
this property interest in at least one case in which the parties conceded the
interest exists. See Setliff v. Mem'l Hosp. of Sheridan County, 850 F.2d 1384,
1395 (10th Cir.1988). 14
Furthermore, Dr. Martin respectfully disagrees with the trial court’s analysis under
Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder Cty. Sch. Dist., 16 P.3d 533 (Utah
2000), that the medical staff membership and clinical privileges extended to Dr. Martin,
once revoked, cannot constitute a “flagrant” violation of his constitutional rights. In July
of 2014, Dr. Martin lost his membership within the Hospital, employment as the Medical
Director at the UPCC, and received a letter that he was “Terminated by his Department”,
the ramifications of which can be career ending for a physician in a similarly situated
position. Despite that, the trial court refused to recognize that nowhere in the record did
the University ever indicate that it was opting not to renew Dr. Martin’s contracts.

14

See Osuagwu v. Gila Regional Medical Center, 938 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1158 (D. N.M.
2012).
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Moreover, the trial court refused to grant any of the inferences in Dr. Martin’s favor
that the minor technicality in failing to get one letter of reference on letterhead, or short
delay in completion of Dr. Martin’s fourth application, was actually just an excuse to
unilaterally rescind the second contract the University had entered into with Dr. Martin
(because the Division of Emergency Medicine needed to make a budget cut somewhere
and with Dr. Barton leaving, his prior idea of having a joint program with the UPCC was
no longer desired), which deprived Dr. Martin of the opportunity to work at the University
for another year.
As a result, the trial court resolved the factual disputes in favor of the University on
Dr. Martin’s procedural due process claims in a way that was clearly erroneous, and where
Dr. Martin has met his higher burden, this Court should reverse the trial court as to his First
and Second Causes of Action, and permit him to move forward to trial on the same.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court’s ruling that
granted the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and remand for further
proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of March, 2018.

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

/s/ Julia D. Kyte
Julia D. Kyte
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS G. MARTIN, M.D.,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 160906038

vs.
Judge Andrew H. Stone
THE UNIVERISTY OF UTAH; THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH COLLEGE OF
PHARMACY; UTAH POISON CONTROL
CENTER; BARBARA CROUCH, in her official
and individual capacities; DIANA BRIXNER, in
her official and individual capacities; ERIK
BARTON, in his official and individual
capacities; STEPHEN HARTSELL, in his
official and individual capacities; SAMUEL
FINLAYSON, in his official and individual
capacities; HEIDI THOMPSON, in her official
and individual capacities; PAULA PEACOCK,
in her official and individual capacities; and
DOES 1-10 in their official and individual
capacities,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on September 6, 2017, in connection with the plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and the defendants' cross Motion for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the parties' written submissions, the relevant
legal authorities and counsel's oral argument. Being now fully informed, the Court rules as stated herein.
The material facts in this case may be organized in the order of chronology. On August 2, 2013, the
plaintiff was sent a letter signed by defendant Barbara Crouch, the Executive Director of the Utah Poison Control
Center ("UPCC"), and defendant Diana Brixner, Chair of the Department of Pharmacotherapy, stating:
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I a.-n pleased to offer you the position of Medical Director, Utah Poison Control Center with a
faculty appointment in the College of Pharmacy at the rank of Associate Professor (Clinical). This
position will start at 0.75 FTE funded by the Utah Poison Control Center with a transition to a split
position with your primary academic appointment in the Division of Emergency Medicine,
Department of Surgery, to start July l, 2014.
(Deposition Exhibit 18). The plaintiff"accepted" by signing the letter on August 2, 2013 .
An August 15, 2013, letter to the plaintiff confirmed the need for final approval of the President and Board
of Trustees of the University of Utah. The letter also specified that the initial term of appointment was from October
1, 2013 until June 30, 2014, and that the

appointment was to "automatically renew each year thereafter for

successive terms of one (1) year unless either [the plaintiff] or the University gives written notice to the other of its
intent not to renew [the plaintiffs] appointment." The plaintiff accepted this letter on August 22, 2013.
The plaintiff then relocated from Seattle, Washington, in the fall of2013 and purchased a residence in Salt
Lake City. On September 6, 2013, the plaintiff obtained his medical licenses in the State of Utah, and started as the
Medical Director of the UPCC on October 1, 2013. The plaintiff's application for medical credentials to practice in
the University of Utah Hospital was approved on or about October 9, 2013. A November 12, 2013, letter from the
President of the University of Utah, sent to the plaintiff, advised him that the "the University's Board of Trustees has
approved your appointment in the full-time clinical track as Associate Professor (Clinical) of Pharmacotherapy,
effective October 1, 2013 and ending June 30, 2014."
On November 19, 2013, defendant Heidi Thompson, Manager of Medical Staff Services, sent a letter to the
plaintiff stating:

"I am pleased to inform you that upon the recommendations of the Credentials Committee and

approval of the Medical Hospital Boards, your application for privileges at the University of Utah Hospitals and
Clinics has been

~pproved

. . . Your reappointment/appointment is for the period: 10/02/2013 to 10/01/2015.

Category: Active. Status: Provisional. Division: Emergency Medicine. Department: Surgery." The defense
maintains that this letter was issued in error because the plaintiff did not have a faculty appointment in the School of
Medicine or the Department of Surgery. (Deposition Exhibit 70).
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In a letter, dated December 3, 2013, but not received by the plaintiff until February of2014, defendant Erik
Barton, Chief of the Division of Emergency Medicine, and defendant Samuel Finlayson, Chair of the Department of
Surgery, offered the plaintiff "a position on the faculty in the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of
Surgery at the University of Utah School of Medicine." (Deposition Exhibit 72). The letter details the approval
process for the offer of appointment and states that the initial term of appointment "is intended to begin on July 1,
2014."
On January 23, 2014, Becky Brice, an administrative assistant in the Department of Surgery sent the
following email to the plaintiff:

"Because of your faculty rank, you need three outside the institution letters. You

currently have two from Drs. Townes and Cummins. Would you please solicit one more? Thanks. If you would have
sent to my attention that would be preferable."
On March 28, 2014, and April 4, 2014, defendant Paula Peacock, an assistant within the Department of
Surgery, emailed the plaintiff and asked him to call Ors. Townes and Hurley to instruct them to print their letters on
letterhead.
On April 21, 2014, Dr. Barton sent an email to the plaintiff indicating that there were deficiencies in his
application materials. Dr. Barton informed the plaintiff that if he did not complete two aspects of his credentialing
application by April 25, 2014, his "packet will not be approved and you will not have your clinical appointment in
the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery, or be able to work in our ED starting in July." The
April 25th deadline was subsequently extended to May 3•d.
The plaintiff responded to Dr. Barton on April 23, 2014, informing him that his CV had been submitted in
the proper format, one letter of reference on letterhead was submitted, and the other two were promised to fulfill all
outstanding requirements. The defense denies that the plaintiffs CV was in the proper format.
On May 13, 2014, Dr. Barton informed the plaintiff that his credentialing packet was not successful. The
defense asserts that the plaintiff failed to obtain all of the required letters of recommendation, in the proper format,
by the designated deadline.
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On May 15, 2014, the plaintiff sent a letter of recommendation on letterhead from Dr. Townes. However,
the defense maintains that this was past the April 25 111 or May 3rd deadlines that the plaintiff had been given and only
after Dr. Barton had already informed the plaintiff of his failed application.
On May 28, 2014, the plaintiff received an email from Ms. Thompson indicating that his privileges and
medical staff appointment were terminated as of May 27, 2014.

According to the defense, the plaintiff was not a

faculty member of the School of Medicine and therefore should never have received privileges in the first place.
The plaintiff-seeknummaryjudgment on-his remaining·five-caus~s ofaction-:- With-respecno the-First and - Second Causes of Action, the plaintiff asserts that he was deprived of procedural due process under Article 1,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution and that the defendants violated the Procedural Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. The latter claim is being brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs Third and Fourth
Causes of Action allege that the defendants breached each of the plaintiffs three contracts for employment and that
they acted in bad faith by depriving the plaintiff from continued employment at the University of Utah. Finally, in
his Fifth Cause of Action, the plaintiff asserts that the individual defendants acted with fraud and malice when they
negligently published certain documents concerning him. The plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is a request for
injunctive relief relative to the alleged publication of negative information. The defense has responded in seeking
summary judgment on these same causes of action. The Court will address each of plaintiffs claims in tum.
The first issue before this Court is whether the defendants violated Article l, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution in denying the plaintiff his procedural due process rights. The plaintiff asserts that the defendants
deprived him of procedural due process rights with respect to (1) his ability to continue in his faculty appointment in
the Department of Pharmacotherapy and as Medical Director of the UPCC; (2) the revocation of his medical
privileges; and (3) the determination that he failed to submit a timely, complete application to achieve a School of
Medicine faculty appointment.
Notably, in their Opposition to the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the defense asserts that based
on the allegations of the Complaint, the plaintiff has limited his state due process claim to the alleged deprivation of
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only his medical staff privileges and not his employment. The plaintiff counters that the defendants' interpretation
of the Complaint is too narrow. According to the plaintiff, he has claimed that the defendants failed to provide him
due process with respect to his employment and faculty status when they violated the Medical Staff Bylaws and
Policies for the UUHC.
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court notes that Paragraph 82 specifically alleges that "[the] Defendants
engaged in deliberate actions that deprived Dr. Martin of his medical staff privileges at the University of Utah that
he obtained on November 19, 2013. Dr. Martin's medical staff privileges are a recognized property interest subject
to state constitutional due process protections." (Complaint at para. 82). However, a broader view of the Complaint
suggests that the plaintiff is also alleging a due process claim relating to a prospective faculty appointment with the
School of Medicine and continued employment with the Department of Pharmacotherapy. The Court therefore
examines the alleged due process deprivations with respect to both the plaintiff's medical staff privileges and
prospective/future employment.
The plaintiffs employment-based due process claims rest on an alleged series of employment contracts
and the Bylaws.

However, as discussed in more detail below, the plaintiffs due process claims based on

prospective or future employment can only be based upon (1) a contract pertaining to the plaintiffs position of
Medical Director of the UPCC with a faculty appointment in the College of Pharmacy, and (2) a qualified and
conditional offer to achieve a School of Medicine faculty appointment upon the successful submission and
acceptance of an application. As to the latter, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs application was incomplete as of
the April 25th or May 3rd deadlines established by Dr. Barton. Ms. Peacock's unrebutted deposition testimony as
well as the docwnentary evidence before the Court establish that the plaintiff was required to provide three letters of
reference on letterhead prior to these deadlines and that he failed to provide a third compliant letter until May 15,
2014.
Further, the plaintiff's assertion that he was not provided with written instructions relative to the
application process or an actual deadline is clearly contradicted by the record showing that he was repeatedly
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contacted regarding his obligations in completing the application, the stated dead!ine(s) and the consequences of a
failure to follow through.

The March and April, 2014, correspondence between the plaintiff and the various

individual defendants confirms that he was fully aware of the requirements and the deadlines, but nevertheless failed
to comply, leading to a rejection of his application because it was incomplete.
Further, the plaintiffs position as Medical Director with a faculty position in the College of Pharmacy was
the subject of the August 15, 2013, offer letter - the parties' first agreement. This agreement provides for automatic
renewal each -yeai "unless eitller you or tlle Uiiiversify gives written notice to the other of its intent not to
renew your appointments." (Emphasis added). It is undisputed that the University had the right and did exercise
its option not to renew the plaintiff's positions on June 25, 2014.
Ultimately, the plaintiff did not have a right to a School of Medicine faculty appointment and did not have
a right to continued employment beyond the term of the first agreement. He has therefore suffered no deprivation of
a constitutionally protected property interest. Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiff is claiming a due process
violation relative to his employment status, the Court grants the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court next addresses the plaintiff's due process claim regarding his medical staff privileges and
whether the revocation of these privileges without providing him with a hearing amounts to a constitutional
deprivation. The defense correctly points out that there are no Utah cases which recognize medical staff privileges
to be constitutionally protected rights. The plaintiff has cited federal court cases recognizing that medical staff
privileges embody a constitutionally protected property interest.

See e.g. Osuagwu v. Gila Regional Medical

Center, 938 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1158 (D. N.M. 2012). However, the presumption in these cases that a physician has a
valuable property interest in such privileges is based on an underlying logical inference that the privilege was
correctly and properly extended to the physician in the first place. 'W"nile the plaintiff maintains that medicai
privileges were a mandated requirement for him to act as the Medical Director at the UPCC, Ms. Thompson has
testified that the medical staff privileges granted by her department to the plaintiff was in error because the only
faculty appointment that accompanied his medical staff application was the College of Pharmacy, Department of
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Pharmacotherapy faculty appointment, and, according to the Bylaws, the plaintiff should not have had his
privileging or credentialing approved without a School of Medicine faculty appointment. (Exhibit 6, Thompson
Dep. at 65:10-11). Ms. Thompson's testimony and the controlling language of the Bylaws which requires a School
of Medicine faculty appointment in advance of medical staff privileges being extended to a physician are unrefuted.
Clearly, the plaintiffs privileges were granted prematurely when his right to the same was not yet vested because his
faculty appointment in the School of Medicine was still subject to the application process and was not a fait
accompli by any means. Thus, in contrast to the cases cited by the plaintiff, the plaintiffs interest in the medical
privileges never rose to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest.
As a corollary, under Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder Cty. Sch. Dist .. 16 P.3d 533
(Utah 2000), the Court is not persuaded that the medical staff privileges extended to the plaintiff garnered
constitutional due process protections such that the revocation of the same constitutes a "flagrant" violation of his
constitutional rights. 1

In addition, where the plaintiff has asserted identical §1983 and contract claims, he has

established the existence of other avenues ofrelief, thus failing the second element of Spackman.
Further, since the plaintiff cannot meet his burden under Spackman, his state law liberty interest claim
similarly fails as a matter of law, assuming of course that an employee has a liberty interest in his reputation under
the Utah Constitution.2 In addition, the plaintiff cannot maintain a claim that his reputation was harmed because of
the revocation of privileges which were prematurely granted and could be revoked once the plaintiffs faculty
appointment in the School of Medicine failed to materialize. The Court therefore grants summary judgment to the
defense on the plaintiffs First Cause of Action in the entirety.

1

The Court notes that the plaintiff has not evaluated the elements of Spackman in any detail and has
primarily focused only on the first element.
2

The Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to cite any legal authority that would support such a
claim and the Court will not extend State v. Briggs, 199 P .3d 948 (Utah 2008), beyond its finding of a
liberty interest under the United States Constitution.
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As to the plaintiffs Second Cause of Action, the defendants have asserted qualified immunity. Under
Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009), "[w]hen a defendant asserts qualified immunity at
summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right,
and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established." (Citations omitted). Based on the foregoing analysis, the
Court determines that the plaintiff has not met his burden in establishing a constitutional violation that was clearly
established. To the contrary, as with his state constitutional due process claim, the plaintiff has not established a
deprivation-of-hisdue process rights eitherin connection-with-his -continued employment-or-with-the-revocation-of
his medical staff privileges. Ultimately, the plaintiff did not have the required academic appointment and was
therefore not entitled to continued enjoyment of the medical staff privileges which were prematurely granted.
Likewise, no due process rights attached to the plaintiffs employment which was subject to non-renewal at the
option of the University prior to June 30, 2014. Finally, the plaintiffs claim of a federal liberty interest fails under
the same standards set forth above. The Court therefore grants summary judgment on the plaintiffs Second Cause
of Action. As a corollary, because the plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is predicated on prevailing on the Second
Cause of Action, the Court's determination in granting summary judgment on this claim also entitles the defense to
summary judgment on the plaintiffs injunctive relief claim.
Next, with respect to his Third Cause of Action, the plaintiff asserts that the defendants breached the
Bylaws and two alleged employment contracts.

Again, the first contract between the parties pertains to the

plaintiff's position of Medical Director of the UPCC with a faculty appointment in the College of Pharmacy. Under
this contract, the plaintiff was offered a one-year appointment with a transition to a split appointment with the
School of Medicine. This transition and tenure with the School of Medicine, which was anticipated to occur on July
1, 2014, ultimately failed because of the plaintiffs rejected application. Further, given this failure and under the
express terms of the parties' agreement, the College of Pharmacy had the option to give written notice of its intent
"not to renew the appointment," which it did on June 25, 2014. This option of non-renewal was unconditional and
did not involve a disciplinary matter. Therefore, the College of Pharmacy's decision to not renew did not carry with
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it a right to due process or peer judgment before the decision was made. To the contrary, the College of Pharmacy
contract simply expired on its own terms.
Next, the Court is unpersuaded by the plaintiffs position that the December 2013 offer from the School of
Medicine culminated into a contract. By its very nature, the offer which was contingent upon the review and
acceptance of a properly submitted application lacked mutuality and necessarily implied a right to decline the
application. In addition, the submission of an application was no mere formality and its approval, which was clearly
discretionary, was integral to gaining a faculty appointment.

In this case, the plaintiff failed to fulfill the

fundamental conditions of the offer of submitting an application in the proper format and with the requisite corollary
documents. Given the notifications to the plaintiff of the deficiencies in the application process and his failure to
fulfill the requirements by the stated deadline, the offer was effectively terminated or revoked. Thus, since the
contingency did not occur, the School of Medicine offer never rose to the level of a contract.
Further, the plaintiff's reliance on the Bylaws in asserting that he should have been given 30 days' advance
notice that his application would be rejected is misplaced.

The Bylaws have no application to the faculty

appointment process, but rather apply strictly to medical staff privileges.
Finally, the third contract allegedly breached is the Bylaws. The plaintiff again asserts that the defendants'
actions in automatically revoking his privileges without a hearing constitutes a breach of the Bylaws. However, as
discussed in the Court's analysis above, where the privileges were granted prematurely in the first place, prior to the
plaintiff being granted a faculty appointment through the School of Medicine, he was not entitled to a hearing under
the Bylaws when the privileges were subsequently revoked. Having failed to obtain a faculty appointment, the
plaintiff had no vested entitlement in the privileges and the revocation of the same cannot constitute a breach of the
Bylaws. Based on the foregoing, the Court rules that having failed to establish a breach of the two contracts and the
Bylaws, the plaintiff's Third Cause of Action fails as a matter of law. The Court grants summary judgment to the
defendants on this cause of action.
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As a corollary, where the plaintiff cannot assert a breach of contract claim, he is also barred from asserting
his Fourth Cause of Action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

~

Brehany v.

Nordstrom. Inc .• 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991) (The covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be read to
establish new, independent rights or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante). In addition, the plaintiff has
not sufficiently articulated a theory as to why the defendants acted in bad faith in opting to not renew the Pharmacy
contract. Likewise, the plaintiff has not explained how his own failure to fulfill the School of Medicine conditional
offer would implicate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment
on this cause of action as well.
Finally, in the absence of liability under each of the foregoing causes of action, the Court denies the
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a liability determination against the defendants in their personal
capacity under the plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action.

While the defense has moved for summary judgment in the

entirety, the Court could not locate any specific legal argument on the plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action. Therefore,
while denying the plaintiffs Motion in this regard, the Court cannot grant the defendants' Motion on this cause of
action.
Counsel for the defense is to prepare an Order consistent with this Memorandum Decision and submit the
same to the Court for review and signature.

Dated this

£ c, 1 ~ay of September, 2017.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS G. MARTIN, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH; THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH COLLEGE OF
PHARMACY; L.S. SKAGGS PHARMACY
INSTITUTE; UTAH POISON CONTROL
CENTER; BARBARA CROUCH, in her
official and individual capacities; DIANA
BRIXNER, in her official and individual
capacities; ERIK BARTON, in his official
and individual capacities; STEPHEN
HARTSELL, in his official and individual
capacities; SAMUEL FINLAYSON, in his
official and individual capacities; HEIDI
THOMPSON, in her official and individual
capacities; PAULA PEACOCK, in her
official and individual capacities; and DOES
1-10, in their official and individual
capacities;
Defendants.

ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. 160906038
Judge Andrew H. Stone

On September 6, 2017, this court held a hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment and Defendants' cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Both parties presented
argument and this court issued a memorandum decision on September 26, 2017. Based upon the
reasoning and decision set forth in the Court's September 26, 2017 memorandum decision, the
Court hereby orders that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendants'
motion for summary judgment is granted 1 as follows:
1. Plaintiffs first cause of action for denial of due process under the Article 1,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution is dismissed with prejudice;
2. Plaintiff's second cause of action for denial of due process under the Procedural
Due Process clause of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
dismissed with prejudice;
3. Plaintiffs third cause of action for breach of contract is dismissed with prejudice,
4. Plaintiffs fourth cause of action for breach of the covenant of food faith and fair
dealing is dismissed with prejudice; and
5. Plaintiffs sixth cause of action for injunctive relief is dismissed with prejudice.
The court further orders that based on its prior May 22, 2017 order, Plaintiffs fifth cause
of action is dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

1

Defendant did not move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs fifth cause of action.
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Isl Julia D. Kvte
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